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Jan-Philip Steinmann

Postdoctoral researcher

Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony (KFN)

My name is Jan-Philip Steinmann and I am head of the research unit “Aetiology of Deviance” at the Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony (KFN) and affiliated postdoctoral researcher at the Research Institute Social Cohesion (RISC) at the University of Bremen, Germany. I consider myself a sociologist, on the edge of cultural sociology and social structure analysis. My research interests, in the broadest sense, relate to causes and consequences of (decreasing or increasing) social cohesion. Thereby, I mainly focus on social inequalities, migration processes and immigrants’ integration, right-wing populism, and deviant behavior. Across all these topics, I investigate paradoxical effects of religion. Although I am mostly using quantitative empirical methods, I am also conducting mixed methods research.

I am the principal investigator of the project “The Role of Religiosity in Delinquency among Christian and Muslim Youths” (ReliDeli), which addresses the classic criminological question of how religiosity and delinquent behavior are related. The project is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

I hold a doctoral degree from the University of Goettingen (UGÖ), Germany. I have been visiting student/researcher at Utrecht University (UU) and the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) in The Hague.

My work has been published in several journals, including leading outlets in general sociology (Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Socius) and criminology (Criminal Justice and Behavior, European Journal of Criminology), as well as prominent journals in migration research (International Migration Review, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies).

Work in Progress

Less conspiratorial in crisis? Evidence for a drop in adolescent conspiracy mentality during the COVID-19 pandemic

Using repeated cross-sectional data from a representative school survey in a federal state in Germany (n = 30,185; 50.7% male; Mage = 14.99 years), our study investigates changes in conspiracy mentality among German adolescents before (2019), during (2022), and after (2024) the COVID-19 pandemic. As a preliminary step, measurement invariance across survey waves was assessed using multi-group structural equation modeling (MG-SEM). Mean differences were then examined using t-tests. In addition, latent class analysis (LCA) was used to identify subgroups based on conspiracy mentality. LCA was used to examine changes in subgroup distributions over time. T-tests showed a temporary decline in average conspiracy mentality during the pandemic in 2022 compared to 2019, followed by an increase in 2024, when levels had almost returned to pre-pandemic values. Latent class analysis identified three subgroups: rejectors, ambivalents, and believers. The proportion of rejectors increased during the pandemic but declined below pre-pandemic levels in 2024, while the proportion of ambivalents increased substantially after the pandemic. The proportion of believers remained largely stable and slightly decreased over time. The results suggest that the pandemic did not ultimately lead to an increased conspiracy mentality, supporting the pandemic drop hypothesis. Instead, the post-pandemic period was characterized by greater uncertainty regarding the acceptance of conspiracy theories. The implications of these findings are discussed.

The good, the bad, and the curvilinear. Revisiting the relationship between religiosity and delinquency

The delinquency-reducing function of religiosity is a repeatedly found pattern in criminology. We test a curvilinear alternative, hypothesizing that religiosity and delinquency are negatively related only up to a moderate level of religiosity, after which the relationship reverses. We outline two explanations for this pattern: the religious-ideology and the loss-of-privileges perspective. Using data from over 45,000 adolescents in Germany collected across six surveys (2013-2024), we examine how three dimensions of religiosity (religious importance, religious attendance, praying) are associated with three types of delinquency. Results reveal a curvilinear relationship between religiosity and violent offenses. For substance use, religiosity remains protective, but this effect weakens at higher levels of religiosity. The link between religiosity and property offenses is also nonlinear, including U-shaped relationships and diminishing protective effects. Subgroup analyses show clearer Christian patterns and more complex Muslim associations, highlighting the need for greater attention to highly religious individuals in criminological research.

Zur Transformation einer Konfliktlinie. Religiöse Bestimmungsfaktoren für das Wahlverhalten

Der Artikel untersucht den Wandel des religiösen cleavage und fragt, ob Religion weiterhin das Wahlverhalten in Deutschland prägt und ob sich die Konfliktlinie nach dem Übergang von konfessionell zu religiös-säkular erneut verschoben hat. Vor dem Hintergrund einer postulierten Konfliktlinie des Religionsanspruchs wird argumentiert, dass ein exklusiver gegenüber einem inklusiven Religionsanspruch unter Christ:innen die Wahrscheinlichkeit erhöht, Pfade der Radikalisierung (Wahl der AfD), der Traditionalisierung (CDU/CSU) oder des Rückzugs (Nicht-Wahl) einzuschlagen. Zudem werden rechtspopulistische Positionen und wahrgenommene religiöse Benachteiligung als vermittelnde Faktoren für diese Pfade vorgeschlagen. Die Befunde legen Ansätze einer erneuten Transformation des religiösen cleavage für die deutsche Gesamtbevölkerung nahe. Der Religionsanspruch von Christ:innen ist mitentscheidend für ihr Wahlverhalten, unter anderem vermittelt über rechtspopulistische Positionen und wahrgenommene religiöse Benachteiligung.

Variant or invariant? The role of religiosity in juvenile delinquency across socioeconomic status and gender

The aim of this study is to move beyond the average effects of religiosity on juvenile delinquency and examine whether these effects vary across socioeconomic status and gender. Drawing on the “complex religion” literature and social capital theory, we test contrasting hypotheses about variance and invariance for socioeconomic status and gender. Survey data, collected in 2022 and 2024, come from two representative samples of over 11,000 ninth-grade adolescents in Germany. Using logistic regression with cluster-robust standard errors, we estimated two- and three-way interactions and calculated predicted probabilities, average marginal effects, and second differences. Empirically, the religiosity-delinquency link exhibits a curvilinear pattern for violent offenses and a linear pattern for property offenses. These relationships show little variation across socioeconomic status and gender, indicating mainly invariance. The results remain consistent across a variety of robustness checks. Our findings suggest that the relationship between religiosity and juvenile delinquency largely does not vary by socioeconomic status or gender. Because major criminological theories generally treat religiosity as a protective factor against delinquency, the results concerning curvilinearity highlight a critical blind spot that future theoretical work should address.

Religious boundary dynamics. Religious visibility and perceptions of religious discrimination among Christian and Muslim youth

This study examines where and how religious boundaries are drawn and maintained by exploring the relationship between the visible display of religious markers and perceived religious discrimination among Christian and Muslim adolescents in Germany. It asks whether religious visibility heightens perceptions of religious discrimination, and how this varies by religious affiliation, gender, and education. Data come from a 2024 survey of ninth graders in Germany. Empirical findings indicate that perceptions of religious discrimination increase with greater religious visibility. However, this effect is not uniform across subgroups. The strongest—though statistically somewhat uncertain—effects are observed among female and more educated Muslims. Drawing on Christian and Muslim adolescents in Germany, results reveal that religious boundaries exist, but the main tension is not between religiosity and secularity. This underscores prior research showing that reinforcing processes sustain religious boundaries—particularly between Christianity and secularity, on the one hand, and Islam, on the other.

Religiosity, fundamentalism, and gender-role values among Christian and Muslim youth

This article examines gender-role values among Christian and Muslim adolescents with varying levels of religiosity. It asks whether religious fundamentalism, rather than religious affiliation or religiosity alone, is the key factor driving such values. School survey data from seventh graders in Germany (N = 3,712) show that Muslim adolescents are more likely to support patriarchal gender-role values than their Christian counterparts, although differences are moderate in size. Religious fundamentalism mediates the relationship between religious affiliation and patriarchal gender-role values, and accounts for a substantial share of the association between religiosity and gender-role values among Christians. Overall, the findings highlight religious fundamentalism as the central correlate of patriarchal gender-role values and challenges stereotypes that portray Islam as inherently linked to patriarchy.

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